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only for projects to be delivered through 
domestic companies. This country-driven 
approach would incentivize resilient 
development rather than punishing 
development in general, and the central 
theme of the GCF should be to incentivize 
advantageous action without penalizing 
the disadvantageous.
Private sector facility
The private sector facility (PSF) is a path-
breaking innovation and its effective 
operationalization will be critical to meeting 
the climate challenge. Its role in leveraging 
capital and promoting triple transformation 
will be crucial given the scale of financial 
resources needed to tackle climate change. 
The World Economic Forum suggests that 
at least US$5.7 trillion must be invested 
in renewable energy, sustainable mobility, 
clean water and other green infrastructure 
annually by as soon as 2020 to keep the 
global average temperature increase below 
2 °C (ref. 5).
The PSF must allow the private sector 
firms to act as GCF implementing entities. 
This would require policy innovation, 
drawing upon the experience of the 
International Finance Corporation as 
well as other multilateral development 
banks. A robust criterion for private sector 
accreditation would ensure that climate 
change objectives are not left to the vagaries 
of the market alone. In addition, affirmative 
actions in favour of the domestic actors 
would be vital to ensure that they are not 
crowded out by global actors and banks.
The PSF would act as a critical agent in 
using risk-management tools to mobilize 
system-wide transformation, particularly 
by enhancing country ownership through 
domestic private-sector participation 
and hence by synergistically promoting 
development benefits. This way, channelled 
resources can be used efficiently to scale up 
proven technologies, thereby maximizing 
the impact per dollar.
To enhance country ownership, larger 
guarantees should be offered for projects 
undertaken by the local private sector and 
somewhat lower guarantees for projects 
by international entities. This could be 
complemented by equity participation: 
higher equity participation if projects are 
undertaken jointly by local and international 
companies; lower equity participation if 
solely by local or solely by international 
entities including banks. The combination of 
local with international participation should 
yield the highest impact and reduce risks. 
This is because international expertise and 
private sector involvement enhances the 
likelihood of successful projects and enables 
use of state-of-the-art technologies, whereas 
local private sector engagement translates to 
capacity building, country ownership and 
development co-benefits.
If GCF were not granted authority to 
hold equity shares, it could still achieve 
similar results through subsidies. That 
is, larger subsidies would be given if a 
project is executed jointly by national 
and international actors and entails 
transformative impact. Lower subsidies 
should be granted to efforts that bring about 
significant mitigation potential but that are 
carried out by one of the two actors only.
The financial cycle consequently would 
consist of several steps. First, contributions 
by donor countries are made, 30% of 
which, for example, may be used to provide 
long-term finance to PSF. Based on this 
capitalization and donor pledges, bonds 
can be issued. Finally, reflow from equity 
participation and profits would close the 
loop and enable the fund to maintain a high 
level of investment.
A GCF equipped with a triple 
transformation objective and new tools 
could significantly contribute to combating 
climate change and favour development. 
The institution must galvanize countries, 
governments and local communities and 
engage the private sector towards keeping 
the global mean temperature increase 
below 2 °C. There may be little time left for 
humanity to succeed in its common fight 
against climate change and the GCF could 
be the decisive factor. ❐
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COMMENTARY:
Loss and damage attribution
Christian Huggel, Dáithí Stone, Maximilian Auffhammer and Gerrit Hansen
If research on attribution of extreme weather events is to inform emerging climate change policies, it 
needs to diagnose all of the components of risk.
Extreme weather events have been the cause of innumerable disasters throughout human history. A series 
of recent incidents, with ‘superstorm’ 
Sandy in October 2012 as a high-profile 
example, have fuelled the debate about 
whether anthropogenic climate change 
can be blamed. But blamed for what 
exactly? Blamed for the intensity of the 
storm, the flooding height or the economic 
losses and harm to life that resulted from 
these events?
And what does ‘blame’ mean exactly? 
The public debate often refers to climate 
change as a ‘cause’, whereas science 
views anthropogenic climate change as 
a ‘contributor’ to a particular event, or 
to a frequency distribution of extreme 
© 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
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events. The public may perceive these 
points as nuances in the debate. However, 
clarification of the terms and conceptual 
frameworks is fundamental to further 
progress in the scientific field of attribution 
of extreme events to climate change.
International negotiations under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) are becoming 
concerned with the question of which 
countries pay for loss and damage related 
to extreme weather events, and which 
countries receive the funds. In this context, 
negotiators call for scientific support to 
the attribution problem, as emphasized at 
the 18th Conference of the Parties in Doha 
in December 2012. Furthermore, within 
national laws, the question of liability of 
damage due to extreme weather events 
may gain importance in the future, and 
similarly need advice from science1. Is 
science prepared to provide this support 
for policymakers?
It is without doubt that attribution of 
individual extreme events to anthropogenic 
climate change is a major challenge. The 
Special Report on Managing Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), published in 2012, 
concludes that this sort of attribution 
remains very difficult2.
We can distinguish two main scientific 
fields that are concerned with attribution 
of extreme events and disasters to climate 
change. The first is rooted in physical 
climate science. Although trends can 
be evaluated statistically for moderately 
extreme events, an important contribution 
to climate-related damage arises from 
very rare weather events for which — by 
virtue of their rarity — it is difficult to 
gain sufficient statistical power to detect 
any trends.
Climate scientists have used several 
approaches to circumvent the problem of 
attributing unmonitored changes in extreme 
events to climate change3. The most popular 
method examines another variable that is 
linked to the meteorological characteristics 
of the extreme event, and is better sampled 
in the observational record4,5. Trends in 
observations in this other variable (summer 
temperatures, for example) are compared 
against trends in simulations — both with 
and without anthropogenic forcing. The 
results are extended to the chance of the 
rare event using statistical and/or dynamical 
modelling, leading to a conclusion on 
whether anthropogenic emissions altered 
the chance of the observed event occurring. 
A variation on this method examines how 
the magnitude of the anomalous event 
compares with the magnitude of change in 
the associated variable6.
Another approach assumes that distant 
events have statistical relevance for local 
events. Global data is pooled to provide 
statistical power for a local analysis of how 
the chance of the event has changed over 
time7, but interpretation of the results is 
unclear when local trends oppose global 
trends8. Generally speaking, there is slowly 
accumulating evidence and increasing 
confidence that anthropogenic climate 
change was a contributor to some, but 
certainly not all, major recent extreme 
weather events3,9,10.
Of course, understanding how emissions 
contributed to a weather event does not 
provide any information about whether 
and why that event was damaging. A 
second, entirely different field of research 
is concerned with losses associated with 
extreme impact events. Such studies 
usually analyse disaster databases from 
international organizations or re-insurance 
companies, and find that economic losses 
resulting from extreme impact events have 
increased over the past several decades2,11. 
The increase in exposed asset values has 
been identified as the main driver of the 
increase in loss. When accounting for these 
changes (a method called normalization), 
most disaster risk analyses have not 
found any detectable trend consistent 
with expectations from climate change12. 
However, because of the current inability 
to appropriately account for adaptation 
actions — such as structural defensive 
measures — some scholars emphasize that 
it cannot be concluded from these studies 
whether or not the expected frequency 
or intensity of extreme weather events 
has changed13.
The two areas of research that we have 
mentioned above indicate that current 
science on attribution of extreme impact 
events to climate change has not been 
integrated between disciplines so far. This 
is reflected in the contrasting conclusions 
about observed changes in extreme events 
and their attribution to climate change. 
Although not explicitly a contradiction, 
they portray the different avenues taken by 
the two research communities.
It is striking that although risk is a 
central concept for extreme impact events, 
it is not used in a coherent way in either 
field. Climate scientists have typically 
used the term ‘risk’ as a synonym for the 
probability of occurrence of an extreme 
weather event14. This falls short of the 
broader understanding of risk as adopted 
in disaster risk research, where exposed 
Figure 1 | Hypothetical risk attribution framework. The relative contribution of the different risk terms are 
shown over time, resulting in an overall risk trend. The width and fuzziness of the lines indicate the degree 
of uncertainty for the respective risk term. Blue indicates climatic risk drivers (probability of occurrence 
and intensity of an extreme weather event), whereas red represents social and economic factors. 
Intensity is not shown in a separate graph as it is related to probability of occurrence. Yellow shading 
shows the integration of blue- and red-coloured drivers, with risk being a function of all terms multiplied 
(as indicated by ‘X’).
Risk
Vulnerability
Exposed asset values Probability
Intensity
To
ta
l r
is
k
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
x x
x
x
Time Time
Time
© 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
696 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | VOL 3 | AUGUST 2013 | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange
opinion & comment
assets and vulnerability play an important 
role. On the other hand, disaster losses are 
an aggregate measure of risk, and as such 
related studies do not a priori aim to dissect 
the risk terms and the drivers of extreme 
impact events.
Take the example of superstorm 
Sandy, which affected the east coast of 
the United States. As with other extreme 
weather events, Sandy developed from 
complex interactions in the climate 
system involving sea surface temperature, 
atmospheric pressure systems and the 
related northern jet stream. There is 
evidence of an anthropogenic influence 
on these factors15,16, and climate change-
induced sea-level rise may also have 
contributed to the flood intensity. 
However, Sandy only became such an 
important event because of the high 
concentration of exposed high-value 
assets, in particular in New York City. 
In spite of the casualties and billions of 
dollars of damage we should not forget 
that over the past years New York City has 
invested significant efforts and resources 
to reduce the vulnerability of its property 
and infrastructure17. However, assessment 
of changes in vulnerability — as related 
to adaptation and risk prevention — is 
difficult, and has not yet been achieved in 
an attribution context.
To move forwards we propose framing 
the attribution problem with a more 
integrated risk concept. Risk is defined as a 
function of the probability of occurrence of 
an extreme weather event and the associated 
consequences, with consequences being 
a function of the intensity of the physical 
weather event, the exposed assets and their 
vulnerabilities (Fig. 1). The intensity of the 
event can be expressed, for instance, as 
wind velocity or flooding height. Exposed 
asset values are typically monetary values 
of buildings or infrastructure, but can also 
include assets not valued in monetary 
terms, such as loss of lives. Vulnerability 
may reflect the physical resistance of 
structures to flooding, but also the degree 
of preparedness of people or the capacity to 
recover from disasters.
Figure 1 illustrates that all drivers 
of risk — and thus risk itself — are 
essentially dynamic. The analysis of the 
relative contribution of drivers requires 
high-quality records through time, but 
limited data availability and quality adds 
uncertainty to the detection of change and 
the attribution process. Efforts should be 
directed to improve the monitoring, quality 
and consistency of data concerning all of 
the contributors to risk. The data should 
also be accessible for study.
The proposed risk framework basically 
facilitates progress in supporting emerging 
policies. Attribution issues in relation to 
loss and damage mechanisms under the 
UNFCCC are not simply a question of 
attributing physical extreme weather events 
to climate change. Think of losses caused 
by an extreme weather event observed in 
areas of recent uncontrolled urbanization in 
a specific country. In this case, can another 
country — or group of countries — be 
blamed for this damage because of their 
historical greenhouse gas emissions? This 
example illustrates the need for a broader 
risk-related attribution framework, but 
it also portrays how closely the debate 
is linked to poverty and development. It 
is clear that attribution science cannot 
assess blame because it is fundamentally 
a political, societal or legal problem. The 
consideration of liability is regulated 
differently across current national civil 
laws. However, science can assess how the 
occurrence of a particular event is related 
to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 
and how the damage is tied to the drivers 
of risk.
Hence, in essence, we need the proposed 
framework to dissect the drivers and to 
perform attribution analyses within the 
risk parameters. The framework also 
facilitates a common and shared language 
between the research communities of 
physical climate and disaster risk science 
to increase the level of interaction. Recent 
research, stimulated by risk framework 
concepts developed in the IPCC report2 
in 2012, focuses on the comprehensive 
analysis of variability in both climate and 
disaster losses18.
Eventually, a more integrated attribution 
framework for extreme events provides 
an important basis for the ultimate goal 
that should overarch the disaster and loss 
mechanisms and liability discussions — 
that is, the reduction of associated risks. 
Risk managers and decision-makers 
need to know where to invest in order 
to effectively reduce risks. Despite the 
level of uncertainty in future climatic 
conditions, a risk attribution framework 
can support policymakers by indicating 
the relative, up-to-date contribution of 
risk drivers — including the climatic 
ones — to overall risk, which is eventually 
the determinant for loss and damage. ❐
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